Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard's Philosophy, Second Edition chronicles the life and thoughts of the great Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55). What makes this volume essential is its extensive scope: it provides a glossary of concepts, persons, and places related to Kierkegaard’s authorship, from “Absolute” to “Hans Christian Ørsted.”.

There is not agreement among moral intuitionists on the nature of moral intuitions: some favor a doxastic interpretation, others a non-doxastic interpretation. This paper argues that although both interpretations have legitimacy, the doxastic interpretation is preferable. The paper discusses three salient roles for moral intuitions:Role 1: To serve as a test for moral theories.Role 2: To provide a particularist grounding for moral judgment.Role 3: To stop a vicious infinite regress of justified moral belief.The doxastic interpretation better serves Role 1, given (...) the greater justificatory weight rationally accorded intuitive moral beliefs over intuitive moral “seemings,” upon which we may place little if any justificatory weight: intuitive beliefs provide firmer ground for judging moral theories to be correct or incorrect, adequate or inadequate, etc., than mere seemings. The doxastic interpretation better serves Role 2, in that particularist intuitional belief warrants greater confidence in apparent moral truth than intuitive seemings; and given that moral particularists commonly allot great epistemic authority to intuitions about particular cases, this counts heavily in favor of intuitional belief. The doxastic interpretation better serves Role 3 because (i) the greater agential justificatory burdens attendant to believing that p as opposed to merely being appeared to (or its seeming) that p, warrants that a higher degree of epistemic weight be given doxastic intuitions; and (ii) they are less vulnerable to doxastic ascent-type arguments, which would undermine their basicality as justification providers. (shrink)

This is a book on metaethics—in particular, an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of morality. After carefully exploring the metaphysical commitments, or lack thereof, of the leading versions of moral anti-realism, Kulp develops a new and in-depth theory of moral realism. Starting with the firm recognition of the importance of our common sense belief that we possess a great deal of moral knowledge—that, for example, some acts are objectively right and some objectively wrong—the book goes on to examine the metaphysical (...) grounds of various skeptical responses to this perspective. In great part, the book is devoted to developing a version of realist metaethics: specifically, developing in detail realist theories of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties.Concluding with the rejection of prominent contemporary forms of moral anti-realism, Kulp presents a rigorous non-naturalistic theory of moral realism, and a vindication of the basic commitments of commonsense moral thought. (shrink)

A general history of technology -- Technology in golden age Denmark -- Kierkegaard on the rise of technological culture -- Kierkegaard's analysis of information technology -- From Hegel to Google: Kierkegaard and the perils of the system -- Kierkegaard and the question concerning technology.

This landmark collection of essays by six renowned philosophers explores the implications of the contentious realism/antirealism debate for epistemology. The essays examine issues such as whether epistemology needs to be realist, the bearing of a realist conception of truth on epistemology, and realism and antirealism in terms of a pragmatist conception of epistemic justification. Richard Rorty's essay provides a critical commentary on the other five.

The so‐called “Kierkegaard Renaissance,” which took place in Germany during the interwar period, was not merely the province of figures such as Karl Barth and Martin Heidegger. A number of Catholic thinkers were involved as well. Indeed, after the well‐known Kierkegaard scholar Theodor Haecker converted to Catholicism in 1921, Kierkegaard's thought became a popular topic among the group of Catholic intellectuals known as the Hochland Circle, which included the priest and author Romano Guardini. Such interest, in turn, prompted French theologian (...) Yves Congar to explore the use of Kierkegaard for the renewal of the modern church. Moreover, a trio of notable Jesuit thinkers also entered the discussion: Erich Przywara, Henri de Lubac, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. In short, as this chapter will demonstrate, Kierkegaard inspired and provoked Catholic thinkers in a variety of areas, from theological anthropology and Christology to ecclesiology and the question of modernity. (shrink)

In February 54b.c. Cicero concludes a missive to his brother with a passing and – for us – tantalizing remark:Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis. sed cum veneris. virum te putabo si Sallusti Empedoclea legeris; hominem non putabo. Quintus had, it seems, readDe rerum natura, or at least parts thereof, just before he left Rome for an undisclosed location nearby, and he shared his enthusiasm with his brotherper codicillos. Meanwhile, he was corresponding with Julius (...) Caesar, whose staff in Gaul he was about to join. When, a few months later, he was stationed with Caesar, he was involved in another literary affair, this time concerning his brother who wrote to him, inquiring about his autobiographicalDe temporibus suis:quo modo nam, mi frater, de nostris versibus Caesar? nam primum librum se legisse scripsit ad me ante, et prima sic ut neget se ne Graeca quidem meliora legisse; reliqua ad quendam locum ῥᾳθυμότερα (hoc enim utitur verbo). dic mihi verum: num aut res eum aut χαρακτὴρ non delectat?(Q.fr.2.15.5). (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard is well known for his claim that human life is marked by three existential spheres — the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. In Bob Dylan and the Spheres of Existence, Christopher B. Barnett argues that Kierkegaard's theory provides a key interpretative lens through which to evaluate the songwriting of Bob Dylan.

Commentators agree that Kierkegaard's “second authorship” (1847–1855) emphasizes the imitatio Christi. But they disagree in their understanding of conforming one's life to Christ. Does the authorship end with a summons to martyrdom (Marie Thulstrup) or with heightened love of the neighbor (Jamie Ferreira)? The paper argues that Kierkegaard's appropriation of the imitatio theme in pietist literature (especially inspired by Johannes Tauler) shows that human limitation and divine supremacy are the hallmarks of imitating Christ. Both potential martyrdom and the practice of (...) the love of the neighbor rest upon submission to God and reliance upon divine grace. (shrink)

This book is staunchly anti-skeptical. It develops a theory of moral realism—there are indeed objective moral truths—and a broadly commonsense theory of moral knowledge: although we are certainly liable to error, we nevertheless often possess moral knowledge.

In praising Sallust, Tacitus chose the epithet florentissimus in delightful allusion to the former’s apparently innovative (and influential) use of the adverb carptim in his presentation of his novel approach to writing res gestae populi Romani: the adverb and the superlative adjective share an easily discernible etymological connection.

This paper takes up the Disagreement Objection to Moral Intuitionism, which is roughly this: If moral intuitions conflict, there must be falsehood somewhere. But there is no respectable way to resolve such conflict because there is no respectable way to choose between intuitions. Therefore, moral intuitions cannot serve their intended role of grounding justified moral belief and knowledge. This paper rebuts the Disagreement Objection: it recommends a doxastic interpretation of moral intuitions and argues that we have many resources to adjudicate (...) intuitional conflict. I develop analogies between intuitional and non-intuitional disagreement, and I develop the concept of an intuitional background to show how intuitional disagreement may be resolved. The paper diagnoses the genesis of the Disagreement Objection as largely based on the Fallacy of Perspectival Infallibility and on an instance of the Justification Isolation Fallacy. The Disagreement Objection does not refute Moral Intuitionism. (shrink)

The general conceptual features of ordinary, commonsense morality are revisited, after which a detailed version of moral realism is developed based upon the specific findings of earlier chapters: moral truth and moral facts are rooted in a non-constructed metaphysical moral reality, exhibited by the actual world. This version of moral realism is then employed to reject the leading contemporary versions of moral antirealism: various moral non-cognitivisms, moral nihilism, and moral relativism in a variety of guises—sociocultural, radical subjectivist, pragmatist, linguistic, et (...) al. Moral naturalism is also rejected, and a version of moral non-naturalism is developed and defended. The chapter closes with a defense of commonsense morality and the non-naturalist moral realism which best grounds it. (shrink)

I argue for a realist conception of moral properties in general, and first-order moral properties in particular. Properties are abstract, platonic universals which may or may not be instantiated, or instantiable, in concrete or abstract particulars. The concept of a possible world—an imaginary ordered-set of compossible properties—is used to elucidate a realist conception of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties. On our view, truth—including first-order moral truth—is truth relative to one very special possible world, viz., the actual world. The (...) chapter ends with an analysis and critique of moral naturalism, and develops a version of moral non-naturalism, which includes a defense of the gradeablity of first-order moral properties. (shrink)

Commonsensically, we think we know many moral truths—that rape is wrong, that it is praiseworthy to return kindness with kindness, etc. Moral skeptics disagree. Epistemic moral skeptics think that even if there are moral truths, we can’t know them; metaphysical moral skeptics think that there is nothing to know—at least no “objective” moral truths. This book deals with metaphysical moral skepticism. Commonsense morality is committed to objective moral truths and facts, but many metaethical theories deny that there is any such (...) thing e.g., moral relativism, moral nihilism, moral-noncognitivism. A broad outline of the theoretical foundation of commonsense morality, viz., moral realism, is provided in preparation for a full-scale rebuttal of metaphysical moral skepticism. (shrink)

Barnett responds to three articles that put the thought of Søren Kierkegaard in conversation with modern popular media. He argues that each of these pieces demonstrates that Kierkegaard's criticism of the burgeoning free press remains relevant today, particularly in the areas of journalistic practice, mental health, and political responsibility. At the same time, however, Barnett wonders if the radical nature of the Dane's critique has been fully considered. For Kierkegaard, in other words, it is not just that popular media have (...) flaws in need of correction; it is that the media constitute “the evil principle in the modern world.”. (shrink)

La investigación ecológica a largo plazo (Long Term Ecological Research, LTER) maneja problemas que abarcan décadas o plazos más largos. El programa y su nombre formal comenzaron en Estados Unidos en 1980. Si bien los estudios y observaciones a largo plazo comenzaron tempranamente en 1400 y 1800 en Asia y Europa, respectivamente, el enfoque a largo plazo no se formalizó sino hasta el establecimiento de los programas de investigación ecológica de largo plazo en Estados Unidos. Estos programas han permitido experimentos (...) a nivel de ecosistemas y comparaciones entre sitios que condujeron a una mejor comprensión de la estructura y funcionamiento de la biosfera. El enfoque ecosistémico holístico de esta iniciativa permite también la incorporación de la dimensión humana en la ecología, y recientemente ha dado lugar al nuevo concepto de investigación socio-ecológica de largo plazo (LTSER). Hoy los programas de investigación socio-ecológica a largo plazo existen en por lo menos 32 países (esto es, los miembros de la Red Internacional de Investigación Ecológica a Largo Plazo o ILTER (International Long Term Ecological Research). Sin embargo, la consolidación de la red internacional dentro del paradigma de investigación socio-ecológica a largo plazo todavía requiere: (1) inclusión de algunas regiones remotas del mundo que aún están poco representadas, como el suroeste de América del Sur; (2) modificaciones en el tipo de investigación realizado, tales como la integración de las ciencias sociales y naturales con las humanidades y la ética, y (3) la incorporación de las conclusiones y resultados dentro de los procesos sociales y políticos. En este contexto, la naciente red de investigación socio-ecológica a largo plazo en Chile, que se extiende en el rango latitudinal más largo de bosque templado en el Hemisferio Sur, agrega una nueva región remota a las investigaciones ecológicas de largo plazo que había sido pasada por alto anteriormente. Además, la colaboración con la Universidad de North Texas y otros asociados internacionales ayuda a desarrollar un enfoque interdisciplinario para integrar las ciencias ecológicas y la filosofía ambiental, junto con los conocimientos ecológicos tradicionales, la educación informal y formal, la política, las humanidades, los procesos socio-políticos y la conservación biocultural. (shrink)

The meaning of propositional truth is captured by William Alston’s T-scheme: “the proposition ‘that p’ is true iff p.” Truth is determined by the “way the world is,” whether in non-moral or moral contexts. True propositions express facts, but false propositions do not. Facts are states of affairs that obtain, and true propositions expresses such states of affairs. Thus, ‘It is wrong for Smith to strike Jones’, if true, expresses a state of affairs that obtains, namely, that it is wrong (...) for Smith to strike Jones. Types of states of affairs are determined by the types of properties characterizing those states of affairs. Moral states of affairs are “moral” because they instance moral properties, which supervene on physical properties. (shrink)

Critognatus’ speech has long been recognized as heavily by Caesar's hand, although few have questioned whether any speech was delivered by the Arvernian noble at all; and it has long puzzled readers with its contradictory manner and fierce criticism of Rome. But the etymologizing wordplay across several languages demonstrated below (along with other distinctly comical elements) renders it more than likely that both the speech and the speaker are products of the author's imagination. In its Nabokovian mode, it offers a (...) glimpse of Caesar the linguist and introduces a playfulness into the dire situation before Alesia that suggests that the ‘Barley-Muncher’ and his speech should be reconsidered in a different, more humorous light. (shrink)

This study shows the spatial juxtaposition and separation of topics regarding law in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae. These topics are his treatise on legal structures among morals in its part I-II, and his treatise on legal justice among virtues in its part II-II. This difference in the topics’ placements requires mediation by the virtuality of law, in order to grasp the distances and bridges between the two treatments of law.

Ordinary moral thought is committed to non-relative moral truth, moral facts, and objective first-order properties like rightness and wrongness—in short, is committed to moral realism. Many metaethical theories deny all or some of these commitments. Moral non-cognitivists deny that first-order moral discourse is either true or false. Moral nihilists hold that first-order moral discourse is false because there are no moral properties. Moral relativisms—sociocultural, radical subjectivist, pragmatist, et al.—deny that there are any transcendently objective moral truths or facts. All of (...) these views deny that there is anything specifically “moral” to metaphysically ground. Evolutionary morality locates moral truth and facts in nature, not in the sui generis “moral,” contrary to the view I develop in later chapters. (shrink)

This is a book on semantics, centered on developing an inferentialist theory of concept content and use—a theory that contrasts sharply with the dominate representationalist theories that are the legacy of Russell, Carnap, and Frege. It is intended as an introduction to and elaboration upon themes developed in Brandom’s earlier book, Making It Explicit.

Kulp provides a thorough examination of John Dewey's influential arguments against traditional theories of knowledge; in particular against the thesis that knowing is fundamentally a passive "beholding" relation between the knower and the object known and ultimately, he finds them deficient. He also lays the basis for a defense of a spectator theory of having knowledge, a basis that incorporates important considerations about introspective knowledge.

Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?. The famous incipit—‘And what are you reading, Master Buddenbrook? Ah, Cicero! A difficult text, the work of a great Roman orator. Quousque tandem, Catilina. Huh-uh-hmm, yes, I've not entirely forgotten my Latin, either’— already impressed contemporaries, including some ordinarily not so readily impressed. It rings through Sallust's version of Catiline's shadowy address to his followers, when he asks regarding the injustices they suffer : quae quousque tandem patiemini, o fortissumi uiri?. More playfully, and (...) less well-known, Sallust employed the expression again in a speech by Philippus : uos autem, patres conscripti, quo usque cunctando rem publicam intutam patiemini et uerbis arma temptabitis?. Soon afterwards it served Cicero's son, who, as governor of Asia, put down Hybreas fils for having dared to quote from his father's work in his presence : ‘age’, inquit [sc. Marcus Tullius], ‘non putas me didicisse patris mei: “quousque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra”?’. Just about the same time, Livy recalled it in order to colour Manlius’ exhortation of his followers : quousque tandem ignorabitis uires uestras, quas natura ne beluas quidem ignorare uoluit? … audendum est aliquid uniuersis aut omnia singulis patienda. quousque me circumspectabitis?. Thereafter Quintilian would refer to it twice, when discussing apostrophe and rhetorical questions, just a couple of years before Tacitus has the maladroit Q. Haterius encourage Tiberius to seize the reins—quo usque patieris, Caesar, non adesse caput rei publicae? ; a few decades later still, Apuleius puts it into the mouth of the slave who chastises his master, now in asinine form : ‘quo usque tandem’, inquit, ‘cantherium patiemur istum paulo ante cibariis iumentorum, nunc etiam simulacris deorum infestum?’. He trusted, no doubt, that the famous question would alert his readers more than anything to the many ‘similarities between Catiline and Lucius’, in order to have them appreciate this ‘ludicrous copy of Cicero's arch-enemy’. Some time after, and in a different corner of the Empire altogether, a teacher's bronze statue would carry the inscription:VERBACICRO | NISQVOVSQ | TANDEMABVTE | RECATELINAPA | TIENTIANOS | TRA. (shrink)

Propositions are abstract entities that express the content of declarative sentences, and serve as truth-bearers. Moral non-cognitivists deny that first-order moral discourse is propositional, hence is neither true nor false, while moral cognitivists hold that first-order moral discourse is propositional. Commonsense morality is cognitivist, as is the metaethical theory to which it is committed, viz., moral realism. I argue that moral realists are correct. First-order moral discourse mirrors most of the features of non-moral discourse: the conditions for meaningfulness are similar; (...) their internal structures are similar; their formal characteristics are similar; they function similarly in arguments; etc. Cognitivists are on much firmer ground than non-cognitivists in their respective analyses of moral discourse. (shrink)

Regulatory ethical frameworks governing animal experimentation are a hallmark of modern biology. While most countries have ethical standards regarding the use of animals for scientific purposes, experiments involving insects are not included in these standards. With studies in recent years suggesting that insects may possess faculties akin to emotive states, there is growing discussion surrounding the ethical implications of scientific experimentation involving insects. This paper explores some of the current evidence for the ability of insects to experience emotive states and (...) highlights how current formal animal experimentation ethics frameworks are unnecessary for governing the use of insects for scientific purposes. At its conclusion, this paper discusses ways in which scientists can, and should, uniformly maximise the welfare of insects used in their experiments in a way that is of benefit to their science as well as to the dignity and welfare of their study organisms. (shrink)

Fishers of Fish and Fishers of Men: Fishing Imagery in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East. By Tyler R. Yoder. Explorations in Ancient Near Eastern Civilizations, vol. 4. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2016. Pp. xviii + 222, illus. $54.50.

The Babylonian Theodicy. By Takayoshi Oshima. State Archives of Assyria Cuneiform Texts, vol. 9. Helsinki: The Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project, 2013. Pp. lxiii + 63. $39. [Distributed by Eisenbrauns, Winona Lake, Ind.].

Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, ought to be of greater interest to idealists. Interpreted as an empiricist, an idealist, or a synthesis of these, he admired and was influenced by Kant, and carried on a critical dialogue with Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume, among others. His insight went beyond the limitations of logical empiricism. His philosophical work has much yet to contribute.

Bonaventure’s third distinction in the first book of his ’Commentary on the Sentences’ is the focus of argument, after situating the question within contemporary Bonaventure interpretation and current Trinity philosophy. It is argued that Bonaventure had sufficient philosophical grounds to conclude to the existence of Trinity from its image in memory, intelligence and will. Suggestions are made for why he did not do so.